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Many countries pursue an immigration policy that is targeted at attracting high 
skilled workers. Borjas (1995) has shown that assuming perfect labor markets 
immigration leads to a welfare gain for the native population, the so-called 
immigration surplus. Thus, as the labor market for high skilled workers exhibits 
few frictions, high skilled immigration should lead to a welfare gain. 
Nevertheless, this argumentation implicitly assumes that immigration has no 
influence on the qualification structure of natives. In this paper I show that if 
natives anticipate high skilled immigration, fewer natives acquire a high 
education level. In labor markets that are not frictionless this effect can be such 
strong that high skilled immigration leads to a welfare loss for natives. 
Moreover, if high skilled migration is expected but not realized, this expectation 
generates a welfare loss. 
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Public opinion commonly regards high skilled immigration as beneﬁcial for the domestic
economy. Many developed countries, especially Anglo-Saxon ones, pursue an immigration
policy that is targeted at attracting high skilled immigrants. For instance, in 2002 the
UK has launched the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) that grants free entry
for high skilled immigrants, independent of an employment contract.1 Most economists
also regard immigration, and especially high skilled immigration, as welfare enhancing.
Building on the seminal results of Berry and Soligo (1969), Borjas (1995) has shown that
under not too restrictive assumptions immigration into a perfect labor market leads to a
welfare gain for the native population as a whole. Thus, as the market for high skilled
labor in does not exhibit large frictions, high skilled immigration should have a positive
eﬀect on native welfare.2 Empirical evidence on the eﬀects of immigration is however
mixed.3
These results rely on the assumption that immigration has no inﬂuence on the qual-
iﬁcation structure of natives. If immigration occurs in a single, unexpected wave, this
assumption is feasible, as the qualiﬁcation structure of natives is very rigid. Generally,
people decide about their qualiﬁcation level when they are young and hardly change it
later on. Hence, a spontaneous inﬂow of migrants has only an eﬀect on the qualiﬁcation
level of the youngest cohort, if at all. In the real world immigration occurs in most cases
as a steady inﬂow of people and not as a spontaneous shock. Under such conditions
choosing their education level natives can build expectations about future immigration.
Nevertheless, these expectations need not coincide with the immigration that ultimately
occurs, but may well be above or below it.
Up to now the eﬀects of immigration, or expectations on immigration respectively,
1Zaletel (2006) gives an overview over the HSMP and various other immigration programs for high
skilled.
2Kemnitz (2009) shows that with certain labor market distortions high skilled immigration can also
lead to a welfare loss. However, the real world is probably better represented in Borjas (1995) than in
Kemnitz (2009). Moreover, changes in international trade due immigration can also reduce the immigra-
tion surplus (see Felbermayr and Kohler (2007)).
3As discussed in Longhi et al. (2005) estimated wage eﬀects of immigration vary substantially over
diﬀerent studies.
1on the qualiﬁcation structure in the destination country has not gained much interest by
economic research.4 This is surprising, as there is a large literature that analyzes the eﬀect
of migration on the qualiﬁcation structure in the source country.5 It has been shown that
high skilled emigration, the so-called “brain drain”, need not be detrimental. The option to
emigrate gives natives an additional incentive to acquire a higher qualiﬁcation level. The
positive welfare eﬀect of the increase in the average education level can overcompensate the
negative eﬀect of emigration. The eﬀects in countries that send and receive migrants are
not mirror-inverted; nevertheless, the reasoning of this literature suggests that migration
has also an eﬀect on the education structure in the receiving country.
In this paper I analyze the eﬀects of immigration on native welfare, considering that
natives build expectations about future immigration, when they decide about their ed-
ucation. In a ﬁrst step I assume that natives can perfectly foresee future immigration.
Rational expectations are a necessary condition for this. Nevertheless, if there is a steady
inﬂow of immigrants with a similar education structure, the expectations of natives are
probably not too far away from reality. In the second step I analyze what happens if the
expected immigration lies above the ultimately realized, or if immigration is expected but
does not occur respectively. In both cases the expectation of high skilled immigration
lowers the share of high skilled natives by the following reasoning: On the one hand,
the higher supply of high skilled workers decreases their wages. On the other hand, it
increases the wages of low skilled workers, or at least does not decrease them to the same
extent. This in turn means that the expected income of low skilled workers increases
relative to the income of high skilled workers. Thus, it becomes less attractive for natives
to acquire a high qualiﬁcation level.
I ﬁnd that immigration into a perfect labor market still has a positive welfare eﬀect,
although it is (correctly) anticipated by natives deciding about their education level;
4Fuest and Thum (2001) analyze the welfare eﬀects of an adjustment of the native education structure
to low skilled immigration in a unionized labor market. As long as the degree of unionization does not
change, they ﬁnd no welfare eﬀect of the adjustment of native education. Lumpe and Weigert (2009)
analyze high skilled immigration in a search-theoretic framework and ﬁnd that it increases the average
education level of natives. Ramcharan (2002) shows empirically that unskilled immigration from Europe
had an eﬀect on the education structure in the United States in the early 20th century.
5see for instance Docquier and Rapoport (2007), Mountford (1997), Stark and Wang (2002) and Vidal
(1998)
2however, the eﬀect is in general smaller than in the case without adjustment. If natives
expect high skilled immigration deciding about their education level but the immigration
does not occur, this expectation has a negative welfare eﬀect. In a labor market that is
not frictionless the eﬀects of an adjustment of the native education structure can still be
stronger. With a ﬁxed minimum wage the welfare eﬀect of a correctly anticipated high
skilled immigration is positive without and can become negative with an adjustment of
the native education structure. To get a more comprehensive picture of these eﬀects I
specify a CES-type production function and calibrate my model. For the calibration three
diﬀerent assumptions on migration are used: The ﬁrst is that immigration is expected
and occurs, the second that immigration occurs but is not expected and the third that
immigration is expected but does not occur. I ﬁnd that in the case of perfect labor markets
the immigration surplus is only moderately aﬀected by the adjustment of the education
structure of natives. However, with a minimum wage educational adjustment leads to a
large welfare loss.
The paper is organized in the following way: In the second chapter I present the
baseline assumptions of the model and derive the results in the case of perfect labor
markets. In chapter 3 I analyze the model under the assumption of ﬁxed minimum wage.
The fourth chapter gives an overview over my calibrations and their results. Chapter 5
deals with the policy implications and chapter 6 concludes.
2 Immigration eﬀects with perfect labor markets
My analysis is based on a simple overlapping generations model. The population consists
of two cohorts, young and working age people;6 at each point in time only one cohort
is in the labor market. People decide about their education when they are young; at
this stage they have already rational expectations about the educational decision of other
natives. I deﬁne the share of natives in a cohort who acquire a high skill level as ct and
the size of the cohort as Nt; thus, the number of high skilled natives in a cohort is ctNt.
To acquire a high education level teaching is necessary, whereas a low education level is
6Adding a cohort of old people would have no inﬂuence on the results.
3reached without teaching.7 The time spent in the labor market is not aﬀected by the
education level and the same for all people.8 The overall teaching necessary to qualify the
high skilled people of one cohort is E (ctNt). Teachers are high skilled people from the
previous cohort. During his working age the teaching eﬀort of one teacher is E0. Thus,




High skilled people can freely change between diﬀerent jobs, thus all high skilled people





Education costs have to be beard by the educated people. When they are young, people
do not have any income; thus, a high education level can be ﬁnanced by credit at market
interest rate r (capital markets are assumed to be perfect). This credit is repaid in the
second period.
Innate ability of people follows some distribution, that does not depend on the cohort
size and is not further speciﬁed;9 the higher the innate ability of a person the less teaching
she necessitates to become high skilled. Hence, if it pays oﬀ for a person with a certain
level of innate ability to become high skilled, it also pays oﬀ for all people with higher
education levels. As there is one single high skilled wage and one single low skilled wage,
the amount of the education costs is the only factor that diﬀers over persons. Analogously,
if it pays oﬀ for an individual with a certain level of innate ability to remain low skilled,
it also pays of for all persons with lower levels of innate abilities. Thus, the higher the
7In developed countries a low education level is neither reached without teaching. Nevertheless,
assuming a uniform teaching requirement for all people to acquire a low education level does not change
the results.
8Most other papers assume that the teaching intensity for high and low skilled people does not diﬀer,
but that high skilled people enter the labor market later than low skilled people. Dropping the assumption
that all people of one cohort enter the labor market at the same time would enormously complicate my
model. Especially as the necessary teaching for a high education diﬀers over individuals, the two-cohort
structure would not be feasible anymore; obviously, even teacher and student could then belong to the
same cohort. Not being able to use diﬀerent education times is a disadvantage of my model; however, in
exchange it allows me to consider the education market explicitly.
9This modeling follows Razin and Sadka (1995).
4share of people that become high skilled, the higher are the education costs for the person
with the lowest innate ability that still becomes high skilled. The education costs EC of









The following picture illustrates this: All natives of a certain cohort stand in a line
sorted after their innate abilities. Now a certain level of teaching costs (wHt=E0) is given.
Beginning with the person with the highest ability people decide following the row if
they become high skilled or not; all people up to the last person for whom it pays oﬀ
to become high skilled will choose a high education level, whereas all people behind
this person choose a low education level. The costs to qualify one additional individual
equal the education costs of the last person that is qualiﬁed (or the ﬁrst person that
is not qualiﬁed respectively). Additionally, from these considerations it is clear that
@e(ct+1Nt+1)=@ct+1  0 has to hold; by the assumption that cohort size has no eﬀect on
the distribution of innate ability @e(ct+1Nt+1)=@Nt+1 = 0.
Production of all goods except of education follows production function F. It refers
to the total production of one cohort and fulﬁlls the Inada conditions. It depends on the
input of high skilled labor, Hft, and of low skilled labor, Lt; the input of high skilled labor
equals the total amount of high skilled labor less the number of teachers: Hft = Ht HEt.
I assume that low and high skilled people are not perfect substitutes and that labor
supply is perfectly inelastic. The supply of other potential production factors is ﬁxed.
The composition of produced goods and of the demand for all goods except of education
are ﬁx; thus the price level can be used as numeraire.
Person i chooses to become high skilled, if the expected diﬀerence between high and













If the diﬀerence does not cover her education costs the person stays low skilled. As
discussed above the education costs of the last person for whom it is optimal to become















has to hold. If the cohort size is large and the dispersion of innate abilities is not to large,
the left and the right hand side of (5) are approximately equal. Moreover, wages are equal
5to the marginal product in production of the respective type of labor.10 Assuming that
deciding about their education people have rational expectations and perfect information
(5) can be rewritten as:
@Ft+1
@Hft+1








This equality determines the share of individuals ct+1 that acquire a high education level.
If the share of high skilled individuals ct+1 was smaller than the equilibrium level, the right
hand side of the equation would be larger than the left hand side.11 However, this would
mean that the low skilled person with the highest ability could improve her expected
income acquiring a high skill level. Until the equilibrium level of ct+1 is reached, there
would be low skilled people that should optimally choose a high skill level.
Assume that people have perfect information and rationale expectations about all
other economic factors but cannot perfectly foresee future high skilled immigration.12
They have to build expectations on immigration and all else equal (6) becomes:
@Ft+1 (EMHt+1)
@Hft+1








with Ft+1 (EMHt+1), the expected total production given the expected high skilled immi-
gration EMHt+1. The expected low skilled wage increases and the expected high skilled
wage decreases in the expected number of high skilled people (Inada-Conditions) and thus
also in EMHt+1. Thus, if the expected high skilled immigration is higher than the realized
one, the share of high skilled natives is actually to low. Inserting this “equilibrium” share
of high skilled ct+1 in (5) the left hand side is larger than the right hand side. Nevertheless,
as immigration is not realized until period t + 1 and education takes place in t, people
cannot correct their wrong education choice. The eﬀect of expected immigration on the
share of high skilled natives is summarized in the ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1 The expectation of high skilled immigration leads to a decrease in the







ft < 2 @2Ft
@Hft@Lt holds. The ex-
pectation of low skilled immigration increases the share of high skilled natives, if @2Ft
@L2
t <
10The wage of teachers equals the high skilled wage in production, see above.
11This can easily be veriﬁed diﬀerentiating the equation with respect to ct+1. As derived in the prove
to proposition 1 the derivative is generally negative.






ft < 2 @2Ft
@Hft@Lt holds.
Proof Assuming in a ﬁrst step that natives perfectly foresee future immigration, the




































































































































E0 Nt+1, see (1). @
































ft < 2 @2Ft
@Hft@Lt.


































@Hft@Lt, (14) and therefore also (13) are smaller than zero.
If ceteris paribus natives cannot foresee future immigration, the eﬀect of expected
immigration on the share of high skilled natives equals the eﬀect of actual immigration
under perfect foresight. The explanation is quite simple: All terms above that refer to
t+1 are actually expectations in period t. These expectations are still perfectly rationale,
except of the fact that they are based on a wrong immigration; this means that now (7)
instead of (6) should be analyzed. As the production function does not change, the eﬀect
of expected immigration on the share of high skilled natives in (7) obviously equals the
the eﬀect of actual immigration in (6). The ultimately realized immigration does not
aﬀect the education structure of natives, as it does not occur until t + 1 and thus after
natives have their choice about education in t. *
If high and low skilled labor are perfect substitutes and low skilled labor has a lower
factor productivity than high skilled labor, @2Ft=@Hft@Lt  @2Ft=@L2
t does not hold
anymore. As shown in the appendix in this case the expectations of high skilled as well
as low skilled immigration lead to a decrease in the share of high skilled natives. The
economic rationale behind this is simple. As well high as low skilled immigration lead
to a downward pressure on the wage per productivity unit of labor. Nevertheless, the
relation between the productivities of high and low skilled labor does not change. Thus,
the absolute diﬀerence between high and low skilled wages decreases and the diﬀerence
covers the education costs for less natives.
Leaving the adjustment of the native education structure apart, the eﬀect of immi-
gration on native welfare is deﬁned as the increase in total domestic production Yt =
F(Hft;Lt;:::) due to immigration, less the wage sum paid to immigrants. This is the












ft = ctNt   HEt
13 andH1
ft = H0
ft + MHt   HEt. As by the Inada conditions F is



















ft), 0  y  1. As @2Ft=@H2
ft < 0, IS is positive; in
the marginal case it is zero. For low skilled immigration the argumentation is analo-
gous. The eﬀect of additional low skilled immigration on the immigration surplus due to
high skilled immigration is ambiguous; if high and low skilled labor are close substitutes,
@2Ft=@Hft@Lt < 0, it is positive (see appendix).
Proposition 2 The marginal eﬀects of correctly anticipated high and low skilled immigra-
tion on native welfare are zero. The eﬀects of expected high or low skilled immigrations
that are not realized are negative.
Proof First consider the eﬀect of correctly anticipated high skilled immigration. In
t + 1 the welfare eﬀect dW 
t+1 consists of the increase in production due to high skilled



















































Additionally, high skilled immigration in t + 1 has a positive eﬀect on native welfare in
t. As it reduces the number of high skilled natives in t + 1, less teachers are necessary;

























13The demand for teachers does not change, as immigration does not aﬀect the education structure of
the succeeding cohort.





















From equation (6), the term in brackets equals zero. Analogously, it can be shown that
the welfare eﬀect of correctly anticipated low skilled immigration is also zero.
An expected immigration that does not occur dEMHt+1 has also welfare eﬀects in t











In t+1 no immigration occurs; nevertheless, the change in the skill structure of the native






































One has to regard that expected immigration has no direct eﬀect on production; F 
r+1


























@EMHt+1 < 0, the resulting ct+1 is smaller than the actual equilibrium value. As the
term in the bracket decreases in ct+1, @
@ct+1 < 0, for a ct+1that is actually too small the





























@EMLt+1 > 0, the actual ct+1now is larger than the equilibrium value. For
a ct+1 that is to large the bracket and thus the overall eﬀect is negative. This result
holds also for the non-marginal case, as the negative adjustment eﬀect has not to be seen
alongside a positive immigration surplus.*
In the non marginal case the increase in production is not equal to the wage sum paid
to immigrants. In the appendix the immigration surplus for high skilled immigration
10is derived. Unfortunately, in the general setup it cannot be shown in an unambiguous
way that the eﬀect of the adjustment of native education lowers the immigration surplus.
However, as shown in the calibration, under realistic further assumptions the adjustment
of native education really lowers the immigration surplus.
3 Immigration eﬀects with a ﬁxed minimum wage
In the previous chapter I have dealt the eﬀects of migration into perfect labor markets.
However, in the real world, especially in Europe, labor markets are not frictionless. In
this chapter I analyze the eﬀects of immigration with a ﬁxed minimum wage. The aim
of this chapter is not to model the welfare eﬀects of immigration into a speciﬁc country,
but to show that the eﬀect of education adjustment can be substantially stronger with
labor market frictions. With frictions on the labor market labor market an adjustment of
the native education structure can make an ex-ante positive welfare eﬀect of high skilled
immigration negative.
I assume that there is one ﬁxed minimum wage, w
t in period t. The marginal produc-
tivity of low skilled labor is lower than this minimum wage, @Ft=@Lt < w
t, whereas the
marginal productivity of high skilled labor is higher than it, @Ft=@Ht > w
t. This means
that only for low skilled workers the minimum wage is binding. The marginal productivity
of employed low skilled labor Lft has still to correspond to its wage, @F=@Lft = w
t. Thus,
the minimum wage leads to low skilled unemployment of the size Ut = Lt   Lft. In this
framework low skilled labor supply has no direct eﬀect on employed low skilled labor. By
the Inada conditions an increase in employed low skilled labor due to an increase in labor
supply would decrease its wage, but this is ruled out by the minimum wage. However, an
increase in high skilled labor can potentially increase employed low skilled labor.
In addition, I assume that the amount of unemployment beneﬁts is equal to the mini-
mum wage. Such a constellation is also achieved if the state does not set a minimum wage
but only a beneﬁt level (proﬁt-maximizing people are willing to work for wages below the
beneﬁt level). The results also hold, if only natives receive unemployment beneﬁts and
low skilled immigration is not too large. In this case low skilled immigrants are willing to
work for wages below the minimum wage. However, as long as the low skilled immigrant
labor force does not cover the demand for low skilled labor at the minimum wage level,
the resulting wage for low skilled immigrants is only marginally below the minimum wage.
11All low skilled immigrants ﬁnd work and all unemployed people are low skilled natives.
Assuming a balanced state budget the state has to collect taxes to ﬁnance its expen-
ditures for unemployment beneﬁts. Income taxes generally have a distorting eﬀect on the
wage structure. Thus, as I am not interested in the eﬀects of the tax system, I use a lump
sum tax, , that is paid by all people, including immigrants and unemployed persons.
The budget constraint is then:
t (Nt + MHt + MLt) = w

t (Lt   Lft) () t =
w
t (Lt   Lft)
Nt + MHt + MLt
(24)
The income of low skilled persons equals in any case the minimum wage; hence, equi-











t+1 = 0 (25)
 does not enter equation (25), as it has to be subtracted on both sides and cancels out.
The eﬀect of immigration on the education structure of natives is diﬀerent to the perfect
labor market case, as low skilled wages do not adjust to changes in labor supply.
Proposition 3 If the minimum wage is binding for low skilled workers, the expecta-







@Hft+1 holds. The expectation of low skilled immigration does not
aﬀect the qualiﬁcation structure of natives. Under the same condition, an (expected) in-
crease in the minimum wage also reduces the share of high skilled natives.





















































































































@Hft+1 holds, as the last two terms in
(28) are smaller than zero. These results also indicate that, if migration is not perfectly
foreseen, an increase in the expected high skilled immigration lowers the share of high
skilled natives; the reasoning is the same as in the proof to proposition 1.









equals zero, as @0
@MLt+1 = 0 (MLt+1 has only an eﬀect on Lt+1, and Lt+1 does not aﬀect













t+1 =  1 the overall eﬀect is negative, as long as the nominator is negative.*
Without adjustment of the education structure of natives the eﬀect of high skilled
immigration on native welfare consist of the increase in production plus the taxes paid by








Changes in the taxes paid by natives and in the unemployment beneﬁts need not to be
considered. An increase in the tax rate raises the welfare of the state and decreases the
welfare of the tax payers; however, as native welfare consists of the welfare of the state





















dMHt+1 > 0 (32)
13As low skilled immigration does not increase production, its welfare eﬀect is:
dWt+1 = t+1dMLt+1   w

t+1dMLt+1 < 0 (33)
This is obviously negative, as t+1 = w
t+1 would result if all people were unemployed.
Allowing for an adjustment of the education structure of natives changes the eﬀect
of high skilled immigration. The decrease in high skilled wages makes it for less people
attractive to acquire a high education level. Thus, more natives stay low skilled and be-
come unemployed. in addition, production is lower than in the case without adjustment
of the education structure.
Proposition 4 The marginal eﬀect of correctly anticipated high skilled immigration on
native welfare depends on the pattern of innate abilities of natives. If the teaching that a
person requires to become high skilled and the dispersion of innate abilities are both small
(e(ct+1Nt+1)=E0 ! 0 and @e(ct+1Nt+1)=@ct+1 ! 0), high skilled immigration has a sub-
stantial negative eﬀect. The eﬀect of an expected high skilled immigration that is ultimately
not realized is unambiguously negative. (Correctly anticipated) Low skilled immigration
has a negative eﬀect on native welfare, whereas an expected low skilled immigration that
is not realized has no eﬀect.
Proof As in the perfect labor market case, correctly anticipated high skilled immigration
aﬀects native welfare in t and t + 1. The welfare eﬀect in t + 1 consists of the increase in







































































































The sign of dWt is ambiguous, as @ct+1=@MHt+1 < 0 holds. If e(ct+1Nt+1)=E0 ! 0 and
@e(ct+1Nt+1)=@ct+1 ! 0, @ct+1=@Nt+1 !  1=Nt+1(see (28) and (29)). In this case (36)














The eﬀect is smaller than zero, as the lump sum tax t+1 is smaller than the high skilled
wage (see (24)).












































The eﬀect is smaller than zero as @ct+1=@EMHt+1 < 0.
As low skilled immigration does not change the education structure of natives, ex-
pected low skilled immigration that is not realized has no eﬀect on native welfare. As










By (24) this is smaller than zero.*
In the non marginal case the eﬀect of high skilled immigration on native welfare cru-
cially depends on the change in the number of employed workers in the economy. If the
teaching that a person requires to become high skilled and the dispersion of innate abilities
are both small, the number of workers will not increase; for each additional high skilled
immigrant one otherwise high skilled native will become low skilled.14 As an increase in
14e(ct+1Nt+1)=E0 ! 0 , @e(ct+1Nt+1)=@ct+1 ! 0 ) @ct+1=@MHt+1 !  1=Nt+1.
15low skilled labor supply does not increase production, there is neither potential immigra-
tion surplus. If the dispersion of education costs is large (@e(ct+1Nt+1)=@ct+1 ! 1); the
education structure of natives does not change. In this case high skilled immigration leads
to an immigration surplus. As shown above, without adjustment of the native education
structure the marginal eﬀect of high skilled immigration is positive.
4 Calibration of the model
For the calibration of the model a production function has to be speciﬁed. Following
Borjas (2003) I use a Cobb-Douglas Production function depending on capital K and














The resulting wages are:




















ft+1 + (1   )L

ft+1
1= 1 (1   )L
 1
ft+1 (43)




For the calibration of the model the various parameters have to be speciﬁed. Unfortu-
nately, for most of the parameters no standard values exist,15 so that they have been set
arbitrarily. Table 1 gives an overview over the chosen parameter values. Moreover, for
simplicity I use a ﬁx value for wHt instead of the equilibrium value; as wHt is only aﬀected
by the change in the number of teachers in t, this should not have much eﬀect.
So far I have assumed that the supply of all production factors except for labor is
ﬁxed. Nevertheless, in the long run capital is likely to adjust to increase in labor supply.
In the theoretic part I have not allowed for capital adjustment, as this makes a number
15 is an exception;  = 0:3 follows the estimation results of Card and Lemieux (2001).
16Table 1: Parameter values in the calibrations
Number of natives 40mio
Immigration 0.1mio,
either all high or all low skilled
Interest rate 0.1


















Capital (if capital stock is ﬁx) 14.0mio







High skilled wage in t, wHt 16,000
Minimum wage (if applies) 13,400
of additional assumptions necessary and does not lead to additional insights. However,
as the aim of the calibration is to assess the quantitative eﬀects of immigration, capital
adjustment should be considered here.
Table 2 gives the calibration results for six immigration scenarios under the assumption
of perfect capital adjustment. The ﬁrst scenario is an immigration of 100,000 high skilled
persons, that is anticipated by the natives. In the second scenario the same immigration
occurs spontaneously, so that natives cannot adjust their education levels. In the third
scenario natives expect that 100,000 high skilled people immigrate when they decide about
their education, but no immigration occurs. In scenarios 4-6 instead of 100,000 high skilled
immigrants 100,000 low skilled immigrants are considered. In table 3 the same scenarios
are calibrated under the assumption of a ﬁxed capital stock. Table 4 gives the results for
17Table 2: Calibration results; perfect labor market, capital adjustment
Reference case (no immigration):
Share of high skilled nativesct+1 49.96% High skilled wage wHt+1 16,413
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 886,442 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,367
Average education costs in t 2,308
1. Correctly anticipated immigration of
100,000 high skilled people:
4. Correctly anticipated immigration of
100,000 low skilled people:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.84% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 50.08%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 888,670 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 888,657
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,413 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,414
Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,368 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,366
Average education costs in t 2,307 Average education costs in t 2,309
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 134.91 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio -134.09
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 586.94 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 878.54
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 735.35 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 731.04
2. Unexpected immigration of 100,000
high skilled people:
5. Unexpected immigration of 100,000 low
skilled people:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.96% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.96%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 888,890 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 888,435
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,387 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,439
Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,393 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,341
Average education costs in t 2,308 Average education costs in t 2,308
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 809.08 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 659.02
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 809.08 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 659.02
3. Immigration of 100,000 high skilled peo-
ple expected but not realized:
6. Immigration of 100,000 low skilled peo-
ple expected but not realized:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.84% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 50.08%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 886,219 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 886,660
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,439 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,388
Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,342 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,392
Average education costs in t 2,307 Average education costs in t 2,309
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 134.91 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio -134.09
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -223.38 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 218.29
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -74.98 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 70.79
18Table 3: Calibration results; perfect labor market, ﬁxed capital stock
Reference case (no immigration):
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.96% High skilled wage wHt+1 16,413
GDP in t + 1 in mio 886,442 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,367
Average education costs in t 2,308
1. Correctly anticipated immigration of
100,000 high skilled people:
4. Correctly anticipated immigration of
100,000 low skilled people:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.83% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 50.07%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 887,927 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 887,918
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,400 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,402
Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,355 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,355
Average education costs in t 2,307 Average education costs in t 2,309
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 141.46 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio -127.57
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -154.95 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 140.97
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 0.65 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 0.64
2. Unexpected immigration of 100,000
high skilled people:
5. Unexpected immigration of 100,000 low
skilled people:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.96% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.96%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 888,081 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 887,777
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,373 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,427
Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,381 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,331
Average education costs in t 2,308 Average education costs in t 2,308
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 2.04 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 1.77
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 2.04 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 1.77
3. Immigration of 100,000 high skilled peo-
ple expected but not realized:
6. Immigration of 100,000 low skilled peo-
ple expected but not realized:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 49.83% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 50.07%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 886,285 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 886,581
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,441 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,388
Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,342 Low skilled wage wLt+1 13,390
Average education costs in t 2,307 Average education costs in t 2,309
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 141.46 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio -127.57
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -157.00 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 139.20
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -1.40 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -1.13
19Table 4: Calibration results; minimum wage, ﬁxed capital stock
Reference case (no immigration):
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.75% High skilled wage wHt+1 16,380
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 791,774 Unemployment rate in t + 1 10.71%
Average education costs in t 2,258
1. Correctly anticipated immigration of
100,000 high skilled people:
4. Correctly anticipated immigration of
100,000 low skilled people:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.52% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.75%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 791,940 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 791,774
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,377 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,380
Unemployment rate in t + 1 10.90% Unemployment rate in t + 1 10.93%
Average education costs in t 2,255 Average education costs in t 2,258
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 249.84 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -1,325.40 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -1,193,53
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -1,050.57 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -1,193,53
2. Unexpected immigration of 100,000
high skilled people:
5. Unexpected immigration of 100,000 low
skilled people:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.75% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.75%
Value added in prod. in t + 1 in mio 793,921 Value added in prod. in t + 1 in mio 791,774
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,341 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,380
Unemployment rate in t + 1 10.59% Unemployment rate in t + 1 10.71%
Average education costs in t 2,258 Average education costs in t 2,258
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 654.26 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -1,193.53
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 654.26 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -1,193.53
3. Immigration of 100,000 high skilled peo-
ple expected but not realized:
6. Immigration of 100,000 low skilled peo-
ple expected but not realized:
Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.52% Share of high skilled natives ct+1 44.75%
Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 789,789 Value added in Prod. in t + 1 in mio 791,774
High skilled wage wHt+1 16,417 High skilled wage wHt+1 16,380
Unemployment rate in t + 1 11.03% Unemployment rate in t + 1 10.71%
Average education costs in t 2,255 Average education costs in t 2,258
Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 249.84 Welfare eﬀect in t in mio 0.00
Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio -1,985.43 Welfare eﬀect in t + 1 in mio 0.00
Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) -1,710.60 Total welfare eﬀect in mio (t + 1) 0.00
20a ﬁxed capital stock and a ﬁxed minimum wage that is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax.16
What can we learn from these calibrations? In the case of perfect labor markets
the following points are remarkable. If capital does not adjust to an increase in labor,
the immigration surplus is quite small (this corresponds to the ﬁndings of Borjas, 1995).
However, with capital adjustment the immigration surplus can become substantial. My
results indicate that with capital adjustment the immigration surplus is by a factor of 1000
larger. Thus, in a long run perspective the eﬀects of immigration on native welfare are
not negligible. An adjustment of the native education structure lowers the immigration
surplus, at least the one from high skilled immigration.17 Nevertheless, my calibrations
indicate, that the eﬀect still has the same order of magnitude. Furthermore, the expec-
tation of high skilled immigration can lead to a substantial negative welfare eﬀect, if this
immigration ultimately is not realized.
The calibration with a ﬁxed minimum wage shows the following: Both high and low
skilled immigration lead to a large loss of native welfare, if they are anticipated. However,
if immigration is unexpected only low skilled immigration has a negative welfare eﬀect,
whereas high skilled immigration generates a substantial immigration surplus. If natives
expect high skilled immigration when they decide about their education, this already has
a strong negative welfare eﬀect; an expectation of low skilled immigration has no eﬀect.
Overall this makes clear that, if there are frictions on the labor market, the expectations
of natives about future immigration have strong welfare eﬀects.
5 Policy implications
In the previous chapters I have shown that the eﬀect of immigration on native welfare
does not only depend on the extent of the immigration that is ultimately realized. It also
depends on the expectations that natives have about it. An adjustment of the education
structure of natives can lower the potential positive eﬀects of high skilled immigration;
16Without further restrictions, the model is not solvable for capital adjustment and minimum wage;
thus, there are no calibration results for this combination.
17This does not hold in the case of low skilled immigration and capital adjustment, because adjustment
of native education leads to a higher LI, and this in turn leads to more capital. Here capital adjustment
overcompensates the negative eﬀect from proposition 2.
21nevertheless, the welfare eﬀect of high skilled immigration still tends to be positive.
The expectations that young natives have about future immigration will generally not
coincide with the immigration that really occurs. My calibrations indicate that, if the
expected high skilled immigration is larger than the realized immigration, this can lead to
a substantial welfare loss. An expectation below the actual immigration has no negative
eﬀect. This means that immigration policies should be designed in a way that natives
do not overestimate future high skilled immigration. Thus, an immigration policy that
is targeted at attracting high skilled foreigners at all costs can be dangerous. It tends
to lead natives to expect a relatively large inﬂow of high skilled people. If the expected
inﬂow is not realized, the native population suﬀers a welfare loss.
In reality the native population does not only consist of two types of workers. Hence,
immigration can aﬀect the native education structure in multiple ways. A simple example
for this is the following. Assume that there are three education levels: low skilled, skilled
in the technical sector and skilled in the administrative sector. Moreover, people now
cannot choose if they become low skilled or high skilled workers, but high skilled workers
can decide if they acquire technical or administrative skills. In addition, it is nearby that
a technical training is more expensive than an administrative training and that capital
adjusts more to technical than to administrative labor. Under these assumptions high
and low skilled labor in my model can be replaced by technical and administrative labor
(except for the part with the minimum wage). My model would then predict that the
import of foreign persons with technical skills reduces the potential number of natives
with technical skills.
Designing an immigration policy these adjustment eﬀects have to be taken into ac-
count. At ﬁrst sight a program that is targeted at attracting high skilled foreigners, for
instance engineers, may be very attractive. Already in the short run it will lead to an
immigration surplus. Moreover, if the state ﬁnances higher education at least to a certain
degree, it can save costs importing engineers who have been trained abroad. Nevertheless,
the immigration of these engineers lowers the potential income of native engineers, who
compete with them. This eﬀect is a priori not bad; however, the lower potential income
makes engineer studies less attractive compared to for instance business administration or
law for young natives choosing their studies. Thus, less young natives will opt for engineer
studies.
The political and economic situation in the home countries of the foreign engineers
may improve. In this case, some of the foreign engineers back-migrate and less engineers
22from these countries are willing to come. The number of immigrant engineers in the
immigration country then lies below the expected number; thus, my model predicts a
welfare loss. In addition, the negative eﬀects of the too low number of native engineers
can still be stronger, if this leakage has a negative eﬀect on economic growth.18 Of course,
one could argue that native engineers would also have an incentive to emigrate, when the
wages abroad increase. Nevertheless, in general it is ceteris paribus much more attractive
for people to re-migrate to a certain country than to emigrate there.
6 Conclusions
The welfare eﬀects of immigration depend on the expectations of natives. Rational natives
adjust their educational decision to their expectation about future immigration. The
expectation of high skilled immigration into perfect labor markets leads to a decrease
in the share of high skilled natives, whereas the expectation of low skilled immigration
increases it. If there are frictions on the labor market, the situation can be diﬀerent. In
the case of a ﬁxed minimum wage expected high skilled immigration decreases the share
of high skilled natives, whereas expected low skilled immigration leaves it unchanged.
This adjustment of the education structure of natives reduces the potential immigration
surplus from high skilled immigration. In the case of perfect labor markets there exists
still a native welfare gain; however, in the case of a ﬁxed minimum wage the marginal
eﬀect of high skilled immigration on native welfare can become negative. In addition, an
expected high skilled immigration that ultimately is not realized leads in both cases to a
welfare loss.
Up to now, economic research on immigration has generally treated the education
structure of natives as exogenous. Nevertheless, if immigration does not occur as a singular
shock, natives will consider immigration when they decide about their education. In this
paper I have shown that considering the adjustment of the native education structure
to (expected) immigration can substantially change results on the (welfare) eﬀects of
immigration. To get a comprehensive picture of the eﬀects of immigration on the native
education structure further research is necessary. This research may substantially change
18Drinkwater et al. (2007) analyze the welfare eﬀects of immigration in a general equilibrium model
with endogenous growth. They ﬁnd that the growth eﬀect of immigration can be substantial.
23our contemporary view of the eﬀects of immigration.
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7 Appendix
Eﬀects of immigration on the education structure of natives, if high and low
skilled labor are perfect substitutes:
High and low skilled workers are perfect substitutes and the factor productivity of low
skilled labor is lower. The relation between high and low skilled labor is then Lt = qHt;
with q the relative productivity of one low skilled worker compared to one high skilled
worker. q is assumed to be a ﬁx value that is not aﬀected by other economic factors and







































The square in the denominator results, as now Ht+1 = ct+1Nt+1+q(1 ct+1)Nt+1+MHt+1







19One could also do these calculations using Lt+1 instead of Hft+1 as benchmark. However, then one
has to keep in mind that in this case @Lt+1=@ct+1 = (1=q   1)Nt+1 is larger than zero
.
25Immigration surplus for simultaneous immigration of high and low skilled
people (no adjustment of the native education structure):
As in the case of one type of immigrants, the immigration surplus is given by the increase





















































ft = ctNt   HEt, H1
ft = H0
ft + MHt, L0
t = (1   ct)Nt and L1
t = L0
t + MLt. As F is














































































t) and 0  y;z  1. The ﬁrst two terms
on the right hand side equal the immigration surplus in the case that only the high skilled
migration had been realized. Nevertheless, it is measured with a higher endowment of low
skilled labor. The second two terms give the immigration surplus in the case that only
the low skilled immigration had been realized (measured with a higher endowment of low
skilled labor). The last two terms give the interaction between both types of immigration.
If low skilled wages increase (decrease) in H, @2Ft=@Hft@Lt > (<)0, this term is negative
(positive); a negative eﬀect implies that pure high or low skilled migration increases native
welfare more than mixed migration.
Immigration surplus with adjustment of the native education structure in
the non marginal case:
In the following the welfare eﬀect of a correctly anticipated high skilled immigration is
analyzed; the eﬀects of an expected high skilled migration that is not realized and of
26low skilled immigration can be derived analogously. As in the marginal case, high skilled
immigration aﬀects native welfare in t and t+1. The eﬀect in t+1 consists of the increase


































































t+1 the numbers of workers in the case without migration and H1
ft+1 =
H0
ft+1 + MHt+1   ~ Lt+1 and L1
t+1 = L0
t+1 + ~ Lt+1; ~ Lt+1 is the change in the number of low
skilled workers due to the adjustment of the native education structure.
In period t overall production increases, as less high skilled people work as teachers


















~ Hft, the diﬀerence between H0
ft and H1
ft, equals the decrease in the number of teachers












































in the number of low skilled natives due to immigration.
Combining IS
t and IS

















































A ~ Lt+1 (55)
27The ﬁrst bracket equals the immigration surplus in the case without adjustment of the
education structure of natives and is larger than zero; however, as the diﬀerence between
H0
ft+1and H1
ft+1 is smaller than in the case without adjustment of native education, the
term in the bracket is also smaller. The second bracket is analogous to stability condition
(5). However, the derivatives are built at diﬀerent amounts of the input factors, so that
the sign of the bracket cannot be derived in a general way.
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